Constitution of 1787
The Constitution of the United States (1787)
Source and edition
EditionNARA web transcription of the engrossed document (inscribed by Jacob Shallus)
TranscriptionNational Archives staff (institutional)
Text handlingHTML tags stripped; whitespace collapsed; original spelling, capitalization ("The judicial Power"), and punctuation ("Article. III.", "Section. 1.") preserved. In-text amendment cross-reference hyperlinks removed as markup; the linked words are part of the source text and were kept. The delegate signature roster (a name index by state) is omitted as an appendix, not body text; the attestation and Washington's signature line are retained.
RightsThe 1787 text is public domain. The NARA transcription is a U.S. federal government work (17 U.S.C. § 105). Jurisdiction: US.
Preamble
¶We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Arguments about this provision (1)
Anti-Federalist
- Brutus XII · Brutus
Brutus reads the preamble as the courts will: taken as the constitution's declared end, its clauses license an exposition that extends federal power to every internal and external object and abolishes the states' share.
Article I, Section. 1.
¶All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Article I, Section. 2.
¶The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
¶No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
¶Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.
¶When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.
¶The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
Arguments about this provision (19)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 10 · Publius (James Madison)
The House of Representatives shall be…; Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Madison argues that representation across an extended republic makes majority faction harder to organize.
- Federalist No. 21 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Hamilton rejects state revenue quotas, favors federal duties on consumption, and accepts population as a rule for apportioning direct taxes.
- Federalist No. 52 · Publius (James Madison)
The House of Representatives shall be…; No Person shall be a Representative…
Madison begins his defense of the House: who may vote, who may serve, and why elections every two years keep representatives dependent on the people without the chaos of annual contests.
- Federalist No. 53 · Publius (James Madison)
The House of Representatives shall be…
Against the slogan that where annual elections end tyranny begins, Madison argues federal lawmaking demands knowledge of thirteen states' laws and of foreign commerce, knowledge a one-year term cannot supply.
- Federalist No. 54 · Publius (James Madison)
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Madison defends the three fifths clause through the voice of a Southern brethren, arguing the Constitution treats the enslaved in their mixed character of persons and property. The essay's evasions repay close reading.
Show all (9)
- Federalist No. 55 · Publius (James Madison)
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Is a House of sixty five members too small to be trusted? Madison walks through the census and augmentation machinery and argues the number will grow with the country.
- Federalist No. 56 · Publius (James Madison)
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Madison answers the too few to know us objection: federal business is limited to commerce, taxation, and the militia, and a moderate number of well informed members suffices for those objects.
- Federalist No. 57 · Publius (James Madison)
The House of Representatives shall be…; Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Who elects the House? Not the rich more than the poor, Madison answers. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States, and frequent elections keep members dependent on them.
- Federalist No. 58 · Publius (James Madison)
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Will Congress ever enlarge the House as the people multiply? Madison points to the census clause and to the House's power of the purse as guarantees that reapportionment will happen.
Anti-Federalist
- Brutus III · Brutus
The House of Representatives shall be…; Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Brutus III strips the apportionment clause of what he calls its studied ambiguity, attacks counting enslaved people for representation, and argues sixty-five men cannot mirror the classes and interests of a continent.
- Cato V · Cato
The House of Representatives shall be…; Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Cato argues that long terms and a small legislature leave Congress too distant from the people who choose it.
- Cato VI · Cato
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Cato challenges the population formula used to apportion representatives and direct taxes, including its treatment of enslaved people.
- Federal Farmer, Letter VII · The Federal Farmer
The House of Representatives shall be…; No Person shall be a Representative…; Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Letter VII begins the second pamphlet's sustained treatment of the House, arguing that in so small a body only the natural aristocracy can be elected.
- Federal Farmer, Letter IX · The Federal Farmer
The House of Representatives shall be…; No Person shall be a Representative…; Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Letter IX reports that able convention members urged 130 representatives instead of 65 and that Washington's late intervention produced the one for thirty thousand ratio, evidence the convention 'went on no fixed data.'
Show all (10)
- Federal Farmer, Letter X · The Federal Farmer
The House of Representatives shall be…; Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Letter X dismantles the excuses for a 65 member House one by one, and observes that the Constitution gives state governments no constitutional means to stop an oppressive federal measure before it matures.
- Federal Farmer, Letter XII · The Federal Farmer
No Person shall be a Representative…
Letter XII works out the mechanics the Constitution leaves open, plurality versus majority elections and at-large versus district choice, and concludes elections cannot be put on a proper footing as the plan stands.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
The House of Representatives shall be…; Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Mason calls the House a shadow of representation because too few members will know their constituents' circumstances.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
Martin reports the Convention argument that counting enslaved people for representation increases a state's power in proportion as it violates the rights of freedom, and that it encourages the slave trade.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
The House of Representatives shall be…; Representatives and direct Taxes shall be…
The Pennsylvania Minority calls the initial House too small and too distant to represent the country's varied interests.
Article I, Section. 3.
¶The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.
¶Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.
¶No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
¶The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
¶The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.
¶The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
¶Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
Arguments about this provision (16)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 9 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Senate of the United States…
Hamilton points to state representation in the Senate as evidence that the states remain constituent parts of the new system.
- Federalist No. 62 · Publius (James Madison)
The Senate of the United States…; Immediately after they shall be assembled…; No Person shall be a Senator…
Madison examines the Senate head by head: age and citizenship requirements, election by state legislatures, the equal vote of each state as a compromise and a guard of residuary sovereignty, and the six year term as a cure for mutable councils.
- Federalist No. 63 · Publius (James Madison)
The Senate of the United States…; Immediately after they shall be assembled…
Madison confronts the aristocracy charge directly: before the Senate could seize power it must corrupt itself, the state legislatures, the House, and finally the people at large.
- Federalist No. 65 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Senate shall have the sole…; Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall…
Hamilton defends giving the Senate the trial of impeachments, calling impeachable offenses political in nature and asking where else a tribunal could be found sufficiently dignified and independent.
- Federalist No. 66 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Senate shall have the sole…; Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall…
Hamilton answers four objections to trying impeachments in the Senate, noting that requiring two thirds of senators to convict is itself a security to the accused.
Show all (6)
- Federalist No. 84 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall…
Hamilton answers the missing bill of rights by listing the guarantees already in the text, habeas corpus, no attainders or ex post facto laws, no titles of nobility, and declares the Constitution itself a bill of rights.
Anti-Federalist
- Cato IV · Cato
The Vice President of the United…
Cato objects that the vice president's Senate role joins the executive and legislative branches in one office.
- Cato V · Cato
The Senate of the United States…; Immediately after they shall be assembled…
Cato argues that long terms and a small legislature leave Congress too distant from the people who choose it.
- Cato VII · Cato
The Senate shall have the sole…
Cato questions whether senators can judge a president after advising or supporting the conduct under review.
- Federal Farmer, Letter XI · The Federal Farmer
The Senate of the United States…; Immediately after they shall be assembled…; No Person shall be a Senator…; The Vice President of the United…; The Senate shall chuse their other…; The Senate shall have the sole…; Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall…
The Federal Farmer accepts a Senate representing state sovereignties but wants the confederation's recall and rotation carried over, warning that men six years in office contract callous habits.
- Brutus XVI · Brutus
The Senate of the United States…; Immediately after they shall be assembled…
Brutus XVI reads the Senate clauses one by one: he approves equal state representation as the plan's only truly federal feature, but wants four-year terms, mandatory rotation, and the Confederation's power of recall restored.
Show all (10)
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
The Senate of the United States…; The Senate shall have the sole…
Mason argues that the Senate's long tenure and several legislative, executive, and judicial roles upset the government's balance.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
The Vice President of the United…
Mason wanted an executive council and objected that the vice president's Senate role joined the branches too closely.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
The Senate of the United States…
Martin argues that six-year terms and federal pay leave senators independent of the states they represent.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
The Senate shall have the sole…
Martin argues that appointment patronage gives the president influence over both the House that impeaches and the Senate that tries him.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
The Senate shall have the sole…
The Pennsylvania Minority objects that the Senate holds legislative, judicial, and executive powers at once.
Article I, Section. 4.
¶The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
¶The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.
Arguments about this provision (8)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 59 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton quotes the elections clause and defends it: leave federal elections wholly to state legislatures and they could at any moment annihilate the Union by neglecting to provide for the choice of Congress.
- Federalist No. 60 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton asks whether Congress could rig elections by manipulating polling places to favor the wealthy and the well born, and argues the diversity of the national government makes the scheme impossible.
- Federalist No. 61 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton finishes the defense of congressional power over elections, arguing uniform election times allow a total renewal of the House at once instead of a body that never fully dissolves.
Anti-Federalist
- Federal Farmer, Letter III · The Federal Farmer
The Federal Farmer attacks the elections clause directly: Congress could make a whole state one district or move polling places, silently reshaping who can be elected.
- Brutus IV · Brutus
Brutus shows how Congress could constitutionally rig its own elections, making a whole state one district voting at the capital, so that a tenth of the voters choose the representation; the times, places, and manner power should have stayed with the states.
- Cato VII · Cato
Cato warns that Congress could move polling places or set inconvenient rules that reduce participation in House elections.
- Federal Farmer, Letter XII · The Federal Farmer
Letter XII works out the mechanics the Constitution leaves open, plurality versus majority elections and at-large versus district choice, and concludes elections cannot be put on a proper footing as the plan stands.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
The dissenters fear that Congress could manipulate election rules and weaken the voters' control over representatives.
Article I, Section. 5.
¶Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.
¶Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
¶Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.
¶Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Article I, Section. 6.
¶The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
¶No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
Arguments about this provision (2)
Anti-Federalist
- Federal Farmer, Letter XIII · The Federal Farmer
No Senator or Representative shall, during…
The Federal Farmer finds the ineligibility clause far too narrow: with so many lucrative federal offices and so few legislators, most members will legislate with an eye on appointments.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
The Senators and Representatives shall receive…
Martin argues that six-year terms and federal pay leave senators independent of the states they represent.
Article I, Section. 7.
¶All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
¶Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
¶Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Arguments about this provision (4)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 69 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Every Bill which shall have passed…
Hamilton walks through each executive power in the plan, setting the four-year elective, impeachable President against a hereditary king to show how limited the office really is.
- Federalist No. 73 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Every Bill which shall have passed…
Hamilton defends the qualified veto both as the executive's shield against legislative absorption of power and as a salutary check on hasty or improper laws, safer than an absolute negative.
Anti-Federalist
- Cato IV · Cato
Every Bill which shall have passed…
Cato reads the president's veto, military command, pardons, treaties, and appointments together as a concentration of monarchical power.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
All Bills for raising Revenue shall…
Mason argues that the Senate's long tenure and several legislative, executive, and judicial roles upset the government's balance.
Article I, Section. 8.
¶The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
¶To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
¶To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
¶To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
¶To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;
¶To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;
¶To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
¶To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
¶To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
¶To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
¶To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
¶To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
¶To provide and maintain a Navy;
¶To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
¶To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
¶To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
¶To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And
¶To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
Arguments about this provision (47)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 4 · Publius (John Jay)
To declare War, grant Letters…; To provide for calling forth…; To provide for organizing, arming…
Jay connects national defense to unified policy, coordinated militia forces, and a single command structure.
- Federalist No. 7 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations…
Hamilton warns that competing state trade rules and duties would turn commercial disputes into interstate hostility.
- Federalist No. 8 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton answers the standing-army objection by arguing that interstate rivalry would make permanent military establishments more likely.
- Federalist No. 11 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations…; To provide and maintain a Navy…
Hamilton argues that common commercial policy and pooled resources can support both trade and a national navy.
- Federalist No. 12 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Congress shall have Power…; To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations…
Hamilton argues that a single commercial system can collect import duties more effectively than separate state systems.
Show all (23)
- Federalist No. 21 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Congress shall have Power…
Hamilton rejects state revenue quotas, favors federal duties on consumption, and accepts population as a rule for apportioning direct taxes.
- Federalist No. 23 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
To raise and support Armies…; To provide and maintain a Navy…; To make Rules for the Government…
Hamilton lays down the axiom that means must be proportioned to ends: because dangers to the nation are unlimited, the powers to raise armies and fleets must be too. This is the opening of his defense of the military clauses.
- Federalist No. 24 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton meets the standing-army objection head on: the Constitution puts army raising in the hands of an elected legislature and adds a two-year limit on military appropriations, which he says is more than most state constitutions do.
- Federalist No. 25 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton tests what a ban on peacetime armies would even mean, raising them or keeping them up, and argues any version would be evaded or would leave the nation unable to prepare for war.
- Federalist No. 26 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton defends the specific proviso that no military appropriation can run longer than two years, arguing that a legislature forced to revote army funding in public every two years is a stronger check than any paper prohibition.
- Federalist No. 29 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
To provide for calling forth…; To provide for organizing, arming…
Hamilton defends federal control of the militia as the alternative to a large standing army, quoting the clause itself and mocking predictions that militias would be marched across the continent to enslave their countrymen.
- Federalist No. 30 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Congress shall have Power…
Hamilton calls money the vital principle of the body politic and argues the requisition system's collapse leaves no alternative to a general federal taxing power.
- Federalist No. 31 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Congress shall have Power…
Hamilton treats the taxing power almost geometrically, arguing from axioms that a government charged with unlimited exigencies must have an unqualified power to raise revenue.
- Federalist No. 32 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Congress shall have Power…
Hamilton argues the states keep full concurrent power to tax everything except imports and exports, and reads the express Art I S10 prohibition on state import duties as proof that unmentioned powers stay with the states.
- Federalist No. 33 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton takes on the two most attacked clauses by name, arguing the sweeping clause adds nothing the enumerated powers did not already imply, and that federal supremacy extends only to laws made in pursuance of the Constitution.
- Federalist No. 34 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Congress shall have Power…
Hamilton argues a constitution framed for posterity cannot cap federal revenue at present needs, since wars and rebellions dominate every nation's expenses, and defends concurrent taxation as the workable compromise.
- Federalist No. 35 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Congress shall have Power…
Hamilton warns that confining federal taxes to imports would pile the whole public burden on trade and on the importing states, an argument for leaving the taxing power general.
- Federalist No. 36 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Congress shall have Power…
Hamilton answers the practical objections to federal internal taxes, proposing that Congress can simply adopt each state's own assessment system, and points to the census rule and uniformity requirement as checks.
- Federalist No. 41 · Publius (James Madison)
To raise and support Armies…; To provide and maintain a Navy…
Opening his survey of enumerated powers, Madison concedes a standing force is dangerous yet may be necessary, defends the peacetime army power with the two-year funding limit as its check, and calls the navy power beyond censure.
- Federalist No. 41 · Publius (James Madison)
The Congress shall have Power…
Madison answers the charge that the general welfare language is a blank check, insisting the enumeration that follows the semicolon defines its meaning, and noting the phrase was lifted from the Articles of Confederation where no one read it so broadly.
- Federalist No. 42 · Publius (James Madison)
To define and punish Piracies…; To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations…; To establish an uniform Rule…; To coin Money, regulate the Value…; To provide for the Punishment…; To establish Post Offices and post…
Madison walks through the powers over foreign intercourse and interstate harmony one clause at a time, from treaties and the commerce power to the slave-trade compromise, which he wishes had taken immediate effect, showing each as a repair of a defect in the Articles.
- Federalist No. 43 · Publius (James Madison)
To promote the Progress of Science…; To exercise exclusive Legislation in all…
Madison finishes the survey of powers with the miscellaneous clauses, from copyright to the federal district to treason, and closes by defending nine-state ratification through the transcendent law of self-preservation over the Confederation's unanimity rule.
- Federalist No. 44 · Publius (James Madison)
Madison answers the loudest attack on the sweeping clause. He argues that any government granted ends must be granted means, and that every alternative wording the convention might have chosen would have been worse.
Anti-Federalist
- Brutus I · Brutus
Brutus quotes the last clause of Article I, Section 8 and warns that its sweeping language could be construed to justify nearly any law, including ones that strip the states of their means of support.
- Federal Farmer, Letter III · The Federal Farmer
The Congress shall have Power…
Letter III makes the classic Anti-Federalist case against the general taxing power: internal taxes fix themselves on every person and species of property, and a small House cannot safely hold the purse.
- Federal Farmer, Letter III · The Federal Farmer
To raise and support Armies…; To provide for calling forth…; To provide for organizing, arming…
Quoting the army and militia clauses, the Federal Farmer warns that a select militia of the young and propertyless could serve as a standing army while the yeomanry are left defenceless.
- Brutus V · Brutus
The Congress shall have Power…
Brutus V works through the taxing clause word by word, concluding it hands Congress every source of revenue and, through the general-welfare language, a power to make laws at discretion; he would confine the union to imposts.
- Brutus V · Brutus
Read with the preamble and taxing clause, Brutus argues, the necessary-and-proper clause lets the legislature judge for itself what laws the general welfare requires: a power to make laws at discretion.
Show all (24)
- Brutus VI · Brutus
The Congress shall have Power…
Brutus VI imagines the excise following citizens from cellar to bed-chamber crying GIVE! GIVE!, and answers Federalist defenses: 'general welfare' limits nothing when Congress alone judges what it means.
- Cato VI · Cato
The Congress shall have Power…
Cato predicts that import duties will not cover federal expenses and that Congress will turn to direct and poll taxes.
- Brutus VII · Brutus
The Congress shall have Power…
Brutus VII answers the 'national exigencies are infinite' defense of unlimited taxation: the wartime Congresses asked only for a defined five percent impost, proving the general government's revenue could and should have been limited to marked objects.
- Brutus VIII · Brutus
To borrow Money on the credit…
Brutus VIII pairs borrowing with taxation: an unrestricted power to mortgage the union's revenues could load the country with a debt exceeding its ability ever to discharge, and should have required a two-thirds assent.
- Brutus VIII · Brutus
Brutus VIII begins the case against peacetime armies: the clause authorizes raising forces in peace as well as war, and together with the purse gives the general government control over all the wealth and force of the union.
- Brutus IX · Brutus
Brutus IX answers the ridicule of the standing-army objection: under the Confederation nine states had to assent to raising troops; under the new plan a bare quorum and the president may keep any army they please.
- Brutus X · Brutus
Brutus X recalls how close the Continental Army came to refusing to disband, and offers actual constitutional text: no peacetime troops beyond frontier garrisons and arsenal guards without two-thirds of both houses.
- Federal Farmer, Letter XVII · The Federal Farmer
The Congress shall have Power…
Rather than strip Congress of revenue, the Federal Farmer would confine internal taxes to the federal plan: requisitions first, direct federal collection only against a neglecting state.
- Federal Farmer, Letter XVIII · The Federal Farmer
To raise and support Armies…; To provide for calling forth…; To provide for organizing, arming…
Letter XVIII contains the Federal Farmer's fullest militia doctrine: a militia properly formed 'are in fact the people themselves,' and select corps of the young and propertyless are a truly anti-republican device.
- Federal Farmer, Letter XVIII · The Federal Farmer
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all…
The Federal Farmer sees in the ten mile square a novel danger: a federal city no part of any state, exempt from state law, and likely to become the dazzling centre of anti-republican fashion and politics.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations…
Mason argues that ordinary majority rule over commerce leaves southern exporters exposed to northern commercial interests.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
Mason fears that Congress will use the Necessary and Proper Clause to enlarge its own powers beyond the enumeration.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
The Congress shall have Power…
Martin argues that the federal taxing power reaches imports, consumption, documents, property, and individuals without an effective limit.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
Martin argues that the Constitution permits a standing army in peacetime and that two-year appropriations do not remove the danger.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
To provide for calling forth…; To provide for organizing, arming…
Martin accepts a federal call-up power but argues that congressional control over militia organization and discipline strips the states of their defense.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
The Congress shall have Power…
The dissenters argue that federal taxation could exhaust the same revenue sources on which Pennsylvania depends.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
The Pennsylvania Minority argues that implied powers plus federal supremacy will leave state governments unable to defend their authority.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
The dissenters warn that Congress's army power could enforce oppressive taxes and support an executive seizure of power.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
To provide for calling forth…; To provide for organizing, arming…
The Pennsylvania Minority warns that Congress could discipline and deploy state militia members far from home against other Americans.
Article I, Section. 9.
¶The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
¶The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
¶No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
¶No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
¶No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
¶No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.
¶No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.
¶No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
Arguments about this provision (11)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 8 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton answers the standing-army objection by arguing that interstate rivalry would make permanent military establishments more likely.
- Federalist No. 21 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax…
Hamilton rejects state revenue quotas, favors federal duties on consumption, and accepts population as a rule for apportioning direct taxes.
- Federalist No. 42 · Publius (James Madison)
The Migration or Importation of such…
Madison walks through the powers over foreign intercourse and interstate harmony one clause at a time, from treaties and the commerce power to the slave-trade compromise, which he wishes had taken immediate effect, showing each as a repair of a defect in the Articles.
- Federalist No. 84 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Privilege of the Writ…; No Bill of Attainder or ex…; No Title of Nobility shall be…
Hamilton answers the missing bill of rights by listing the guarantees already in the text, habeas corpus, no attainders or ex post facto laws, no titles of nobility, and declares the Constitution itself a bill of rights.
Anti-Federalist
- Brutus II · Brutus
The Privilege of the Writ…; No Bill of Attainder or ex…; No Title of Nobility shall be…
Brutus asks why the framers bothered to protect habeas corpus and forbid attainders and titles of nobility if no bill of rights was needed; the exceptions prove the general powers imply everything a bill of rights guards against.
- Cato VI · Cato
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax…
Cato predicts that import duties will not cover federal expenses and that Congress will turn to direct and poll taxes.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
The Migration or Importation of such…
Mason condemns the twenty-year restriction on Congress's power to end the international slave trade.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
Mason objects that the Constitution forbids both Congress and the states from passing ex post facto laws without exception.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
The Migration or Importation of such…
Martin describes the Convention bargain that barred Congress from ending the international slave trade before 1808 and condemns the result.
Show all (6)
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
Martin argues that state governments already possess the emergency power and that granting it federally is unnecessary.
Historical context
- Pennsylvania Abolition Society Memorial · The Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery; signed by Benjamin Franklin as President of the Society
The Migration or Importation of such…
The Society asked the First Congress to go to the very verge of its powers against the slave trade. A House committee answered on March 5, 1790 that the Constitution barred Congress from prohibiting importation before 1808.
Article I, Section. 10.
¶No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
¶No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
¶No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
Arguments about this provision (5)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 7 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
No State shall, without the Consent…; No State shall, without the Consent…
Hamilton warns that competing state trade rules and duties would turn commercial disputes into interstate hostility.
- Federalist No. 32 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
No State shall, without the Consent…
Hamilton argues the states keep full concurrent power to tax everything except imports and exports, and reads the express Art I S10 prohibition on state import duties as proof that unmentioned powers stay with the states.
- Federalist No. 44 · Publius (James Madison)
No State shall enter into any…; No State shall, without the Consent…; No State shall, without the Consent…
Madison defends the Constitution's list of things states may no longer do. He dwells on the ban on paper money, calling state bills of credit a source of injustice that destroyed confidence between man and man.
Anti-Federalist
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
No State shall enter into any…
Mason objects that the Constitution forbids both Congress and the states from passing ex post facto laws without exception.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
No State shall enter into any…
Martin argues that states may need monetary and debtor-relief laws during severe economic distress.
Article II, Section. 1.
¶The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows
¶Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
¶The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.
¶The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
¶No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
¶In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
¶The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
¶Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."
Arguments about this provision (11)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 68 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Each State shall appoint, in such…; The Electors shall meet in their…
Hamilton praises the electoral system as nearly the only uncensured part of the plan, arguing that electors chosen for the single occasion frustrate cabal, intrigue, and foreign corruption.
- Federalist No. 69 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The executive Power shall be vested…
Hamilton walks through each executive power in the plan, setting the four-year elective, impeachable President against a hereditary king to show how limited the office really is.
- Federalist No. 70 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The executive Power shall be vested…
Hamilton argues that energy in the executive requires unity: one man acts with decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch, and a plural executive would conceal faults and destroy responsibility.
- Federalist No. 71 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The executive Power shall be vested…
Hamilton defends the four-year term as long enough to give a President firmness against transient popular and legislative currents, yet short enough to pose no danger to public liberty.
- Federalist No. 72 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The executive Power shall be vested…
Hamilton attacks proposals for mandatory rotation, arguing that excluding a President from re-election would weaken his inducements to good conduct and deprive the country of experience when it matters most.
Show all (6)
- Federalist No. 73 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The President shall, at stated Times…
Hamilton argues the legislature can neither weaken the President's fortitude by starving his salary nor buy his judgment with raises, because his compensation is fixed for the term.
Anti-Federalist
- Cato IV · Cato
The executive Power shall be vested…
Cato fears that a four-year term with no reelection limit could harden into life tenure.
- Cato IV · Cato
Cato objects that the vice president's Senate role joins the executive and legislative branches in one office.
- Federal Farmer, Letter XIV · The Federal Farmer
The executive Power shall be vested…; Each State shall appoint, in such…; The Electors shall meet in their…; The Congress may determine the Time…; In Case of the Removal…
The Federal Farmer approves a single executive and even the electors, but argues perpetual re-eligibility means nine tenths of presidents will make keeping the chair their great object.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
Mason wanted an executive council and objected that the vice president's Senate role joined the branches too closely.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
The executive Power shall be vested…; Each State shall appoint, in such…; The Electors shall meet in their…; The Congress may determine the Time…; In Case of the Removal…
Martin traces the Convention's choices on presidential term and election and warns against unrestricted reelection.
Article II, Section. 2.
¶The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
¶He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
¶The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
Arguments about this provision (21)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 3 · Publius (John Jay)
Jay argues that national institutions can interpret treaties consistently and reduce causes of war.
- Federalist No. 4 · Publius (John Jay)
The President shall be Commander…
Jay connects national defense to unified policy, coordinated militia forces, and a single command structure.
- Federalist No. 42 · Publius (James Madison)
Madison walks through the powers over foreign intercourse and interstate harmony one clause at a time, from treaties and the commerce power to the slave-trade compromise, which he wishes had taken immediate effect, showing each as a repair of a defect in the Articles.
- Federalist No. 64 · Publius (John Jay)
Jay defends the treaty power shared between President and Senate. Negotiation sometimes demands perfect secrecy and immediate despatch, so the President manages intelligence while the Senate gives advice and consent.
- Federalist No. 67 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
He shall have Power, by…; The President shall have Power…
Hamilton dissects a misreading of the recess appointments clause, showing by close construction of the appointments and recess clauses that the President cannot fill vacancies in the Senate.
Show all (10)
- Federalist No. 69 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The President shall be Commander…; He shall have Power, by…
Hamilton walks through each executive power in the plan, setting the four-year elective, impeachable President against a hereditary king to show how limited the office really is.
- Federalist No. 74 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The President shall be Commander…
Hamilton defends single-handed command of the military and an unfettered pardon power, arguing that in seasons of insurrection a well-timed offer of pardon may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth.
- Federalist No. 75 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton defends lodging treaties jointly in the President and two thirds of senators present, arguing treaty-making is neither purely legislative nor purely executive and is unsafe in any single hand.
- Federalist No. 76 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton argues a single responsible nominator will choose on merit, while Senate concurrence is a silent but powerful check on a spirit of favoritism and unfit characters.
- Federalist No. 77 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton argues Senate participation in appointments steadies administration, famously adding that the consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.
Anti-Federalist
- Cato IV · Cato
The President shall be Commander…; He shall have Power, by…
Cato reads the president's veto, military command, pardons, treaties, and appointments together as a concentration of monarchical power.
- Cato VI · Cato
Cato argues that treaties made by the president and Senate can bind the country as supreme law without the House.
- Cato VII · Cato
Cato questions whether senators can judge a president after advising or supporting the conduct under review.
- Federal Farmer, Letter XIII · The Federal Farmer
He shall have Power, by…; The President shall have Power…
The Federal Farmer walks through six possible modes of appointing officers and concludes the Senate, which also tries impeachments and shares the treaty power, should not generally control appointments.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
Mason argues that the Senate's long tenure and several legislative, executive, and judicial roles upset the government's balance.
Show all (11)
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
The President shall be Commander…; He shall have Power, by…
Mason wanted an executive council and objected that the vice president's Senate role joined the branches too closely.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
The President shall be Commander…
Mason warns that a president could pardon accomplices in treason and prevent disclosure of his own conduct.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
Mason argues that the president and Senate can legislate through treaties without the House.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
The President shall be Commander…
Martin objects to personal presidential military command and warns that pardons could shield accomplices in treason.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
Martin argues that appointment patronage gives the president influence over both the House that impeaches and the Senate that tries him.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
The Pennsylvania Minority objects that the Senate holds legislative, judicial, and executive powers at once.
Article II, Section. 3.
¶He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
Arguments about this provision (2)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 69 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton walks through each executive power in the plan, setting the four-year elective, impeachable President against a hereditary king to show how limited the office really is.
Anti-Federalist
- Cato IV · Cato
Cato reads the president's veto, military command, pardons, treaties, and appointments together as a concentration of monarchical power.
Article II, Section. 4.
¶The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Arguments about this provision (4)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 65 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton defends giving the Senate the trial of impeachments, calling impeachable offenses political in nature and asking where else a tribunal could be found sufficiently dignified and independent.
- Federalist No. 69 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton walks through each executive power in the plan, setting the four-year elective, impeachable President against a hereditary king to show how limited the office really is.
Anti-Federalist
- Brutus XV · Brutus
Brutus XV completes the judiciary critique: judges holding office during good behaviour, with salaries secured and removal only by impeachment for crimes, are independent of the people, the legislature, and every power under heaven.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
Martin argues that appointment patronage gives the president influence over both the House that impeaches and the Senate that tries him.
Article III, Section. 1.
¶The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Arguments about this provision (9)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 78 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton defends life tenure during good behavior for the least dangerous branch, and argues courts must treat the Constitution as fundamental law and void statutes that contradict it.
- Federalist No. 79 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton argues that next to permanent tenure nothing secures judicial independence like a salary the legislature cannot diminish, since a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will.
- Federalist No. 81 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton defends a distinct Supreme Court with congressionally created inferior courts, and argues its appellate jurisdiction as to fact will not swallow the trial by jury.
- Federalist No. 82 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton reads the vesting clause as organizing the national judiciary rather than stripping state courts of concurrent jurisdiction, with appeal to the Supreme Court keeping federal law uniform.
Anti-Federalist
- Brutus XV · Brutus
Brutus XV completes the judiciary critique: judges holding office during good behaviour, with salaries secured and removal only by impeachment for crimes, are independent of the people, the legislature, and every power under heaven.
- Federal Farmer, Letter XV · The Federal Farmer
The heart of Letter XV is the jury: by allowing appeals from verdicts even as to mere facts, the Constitution, he argues, establishes the civil law principle and explodes the most noble principle of the common law.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
Mason fears that federal courts will displace state courts and place justice beyond the reach of poorer litigants.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
Martin argues that broad federal jurisdiction and appeals on fact leave civil jury verdicts without constitutional protection.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
The Pennsylvania Minority predicts that federal jurisdiction and appeals will displace state courts and make justice more expensive.
Article III, Section. 2.
¶The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;— between a State and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
¶In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
¶The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
Arguments about this provision (17)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 3 · Publius (John Jay)
The judicial Power shall extend…
Jay argues that national institutions can interpret treaties consistently and reduce causes of war.
- Federalist No. 7 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The judicial Power shall extend…
Hamilton points to interstate land disputes that need a common judge rather than an appeal to force.
- Federalist No. 80 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The judicial Power shall extend…
Hamilton lays out six principles for what federal courts should hear, then walks through every head of jurisdiction in Article III to show each is conformable to them.
- Federalist No. 81 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other…
Hamilton defends a distinct Supreme Court with congressionally created inferior courts, and argues its appellate jurisdiction as to fact will not swallow the trial by jury.
- Federalist No. 82 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other…
Hamilton reads the vesting clause as organizing the national judiciary rather than stripping state courts of concurrent jurisdiction, with appeal to the Supreme Court keeping federal law uniform.
Show all (7)
- Federalist No. 83 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Trial of all Crimes, except…
Hamilton answers the most successful objection in New York, that guaranteeing juries only in criminal cases implicitly abolishes them in civil cases, calling that reading contrary to reason and common sense.
- Federalist No. 84 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
The Trial of all Crimes, except…
Hamilton answers the missing bill of rights by listing the guarantees already in the text, habeas corpus, no attainders or ex post facto laws, no titles of nobility, and declares the Constitution itself a bill of rights.
Anti-Federalist
- Federal Farmer, Letter III · The Federal Farmer
The judicial Power shall extend…; In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other…; The Trial of all Crimes, except…
The Federal Farmer reads 'appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact' as handing the fact-finding role of juries to federal judges, and sees no need for diversity jurisdiction at all.
- Brutus XI · Brutus
The judicial Power shall extend…
Brutus XI is the classic anticipation of expansive judicial review: courts authorized to decide cases in equity arising under the Constitution will explain it by its spirit, not its letter, and no power can correct their errors.
- Brutus XII · Brutus
The judicial Power shall extend…
Brutus XII shows the mechanism: the Supreme Court's constructions will become the rule guiding Congress, and by legal fictions the federal courts will absorb even suits between citizens of the same state.
- Brutus XIII · Brutus
The judicial Power shall extend…
Brutus XIII fastens on the clause extending judicial power to controversies between a state and citizens of another state: holders of state notes will sue the states themselves, and executions may be levied on their treasuries.
- Brutus XIV · Brutus
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other…
Brutus XIV takes up the appellate clause verbatim: if the Supreme Court re-examines fact as well as law, jury verdicts become provisional and parties must carry suits hundreds of miles, a denial of justice to the middling class.
Show all (10)
- Federal Farmer, Letter XV · The Federal Farmer
The judicial Power shall extend…; In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other…; The Trial of all Crimes, except…
The heart of Letter XV is the jury: by allowing appeals from verdicts even as to mere facts, the Constitution, he argues, establishes the civil law principle and explodes the most noble principle of the common law.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
The judicial Power shall extend…; In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other…
Mason fears that federal courts will displace state courts and place justice beyond the reach of poorer litigants.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
The judicial Power shall extend…; In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other…; The Trial of all Crimes, except…
Martin argues that broad federal jurisdiction and appeals on fact leave civil jury verdicts without constitutional protection.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
The judicial Power shall extend…; In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other…
The Pennsylvania Minority predicts that federal jurisdiction and appeals will displace state courts and make justice more expensive.
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other…; The Trial of all Crimes, except…
The dissenters argue that the criminal-jury clause does not protect civil juries from federal appellate review of facts.
Article III, Section. 3.
¶Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
¶The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.
Arguments about this provision (3)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 43 · Publius (James Madison)
Treason against the United States, shall…; The Congress shall have Power…
Madison finishes the survey of powers with the miscellaneous clauses, from copyright to the federal district to treason, and closes by defending nine-state ratification through the transcendent law of self-preservation over the Confederation's unanimity rule.
- Federalist No. 84 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Treason against the United States, shall…
Hamilton answers the missing bill of rights by listing the guarantees already in the text, habeas corpus, no attainders or ex post facto laws, no titles of nobility, and declares the Constitution itself a bill of rights.
Anti-Federalist
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
Treason against the United States, shall…
Martin fears that citizens acting under state authority could be prosecuted for treason if a state resists the federal government.
Article IV, Section. 1.
¶Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Arguments about this provision (1)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 42 · Publius (James Madison)
Madison walks through the powers over foreign intercourse and interstate harmony one clause at a time, from treaties and the commerce power to the slave-trade compromise, which he wishes had taken immediate effect, showing each as a repair of a defect in the Articles.
Article IV, Section. 2.
¶The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
¶A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
¶No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
Article IV, Section. 3.
¶New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
¶The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
Arguments about this provision (2)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 43 · Publius (James Madison)
New States may be admitted by…; The Congress shall have Power…
Madison finishes the survey of powers with the miscellaneous clauses, from copyright to the federal district to treason, and closes by defending nine-state ratification through the transcendent law of self-preservation over the Confederation's unanimity rule.
Anti-Federalist
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
New States may be admitted by…
Martin objects that a large state's legislature can block residents from forming a new state even when distance makes government impractical.
Article IV, Section. 4.
¶The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
Arguments about this provision (2)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 21 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Hamilton defends a federal guarantee against violent overthrow of state governments while preserving lawful change by the people.
- Federalist No. 43 · Publius (James Madison)
Madison gives the guaranty clause its fullest Federalist treatment, arguing the union may insist its members stay republican and that confederate intervention is the safest umpire when a state is torn by factional violence.
Article V
¶The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
Arguments about this provision (2)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 43 · Publius (James Madison)
Madison finishes the survey of powers with the miscellaneous clauses, from copyright to the federal district to treason, and closes by defending nine-state ratification through the transcendent law of self-preservation over the Confederation's unanimity rule.
- Federalist No. 85 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
Closing the series, Hamilton argues from Article V's own terms that it will be far easier to obtain amendments after ratification, since Congress must call a convention when two thirds of the states apply.
Article VI
¶All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
¶This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
¶The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.
Arguments about this provision (10)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 3 · Publius (John Jay)
This Constitution, and the Laws…
Jay argues that national institutions can interpret treaties consistently and reduce causes of war.
- Federalist No. 33 · Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
This Constitution, and the Laws…
Hamilton takes on the two most attacked clauses by name, arguing the sweeping clause adds nothing the enumerated powers did not already imply, and that federal supremacy extends only to laws made in pursuance of the Constitution.
- Federalist No. 43 · Publius (James Madison)
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered…
Madison finishes the survey of powers with the miscellaneous clauses, from copyright to the federal district to treason, and closes by defending nine-state ratification through the transcendent law of self-preservation over the Confederation's unanimity rule.
- Federalist No. 44 · Publius (James Madison)
This Constitution, and the Laws…
Madison defends making federal law supreme over state law. Without it, he argues, the authority of the whole society would everywhere be subordinate to the authority of the parts.
Anti-Federalist
- Brutus I · Brutus
This Constitution, and the Laws…
Alongside the sweeping clause of Section 8, Brutus quotes Article VI to show that state constitutions and laws give way entirely wherever federal power reaches.
- Brutus II · Brutus
This Constitution, and the Laws…; The Senators and Representatives before mentioned…
Because Article VI makes the Constitution, laws, and treaties supreme and binds every officer by oath, Brutus argues, the state bills of rights are done away wherever they conflict, making a federal declaration of rights indispensable.
- Federal Farmer, Letter IV · The Federal Farmer
This Constitution, and the Laws…
Letter IV works through the supremacy clause: because treaties are supreme law without constitutional bounds, the president and two thirds of the Senate could override state bills of rights.
- Cato VI · Cato
This Constitution, and the Laws…
Cato argues that treaties made by the president and Senate can bind the country as supreme law without the House.
- George Mason's Objections · George Mason
This Constitution, and the Laws…
Mason argues that the president and Senate can legislate through treaties without the House.
Show all (6)
- Pennsylvania Minority Dissent · The Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
This Constitution, and the Laws…
The Pennsylvania Minority argues that implied powers plus federal supremacy will leave state governments unable to defend their authority.
Article VII
¶The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.
Arguments about this provision (3)
Federalist
- Federalist No. 43 · Publius (James Madison)
Madison finishes the survey of powers with the miscellaneous clauses, from copyright to the federal district to treason, and closes by defending nine-state ratification through the transcendent law of self-preservation over the Confederation's unanimity rule.
Anti-Federalist
- Cato II · Cato
Cato objects that nine-state ratification replaces the Confederation's unanimity rule and validates a convention that exceeded its instructions.
- Luther Martin's Genuine Information · Luther Martin
Martin argues that nine-state ratification violates both the Confederation's unanimity rule and Maryland's own amendment procedure.
Attestation
¶The Word, "the," being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page, The Word "Thirty" being partly written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page, The Words "is tried" being interlined between the thirty second and thirty third Lines of the first Page and the Word "the" being interlined between the forty third and forty fourth Lines of the second Page.
¶Attest William Jackson Secretary
¶done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independance of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,
Questions about the constitutional design (30)
Hamilton opens the series by declaring for adoption and listing the questions Publius intends to answer.
Read cited passageJay begins with the choice between one federal government and several separate confederacies.
Read cited passageJay warns that separate American confederacies would develop rival interests and mutual suspicions.
Read cited passageHamilton argues that separate states or partial confederacies would have the ordinary causes of war found among other nations.
Read cited passageHamilton argues that one national government would cost less than maintaining several separate confederacies.
Read cited passageShow all (30)
Madison argues that representation and divided jurisdiction make republican government workable across the Union's large territory.
Read cited passageHamilton argues that federal laws must bind individuals directly instead of relying on commands to state governments.
Read cited passageHamilton argues that national law should be enforced through courts and magistrates against individuals, not through war against states.
Read cited passageHamilton argues that national officers will focus on commerce, finance, foreign affairs, and war while state governments retain daily civil administration.
Read cited passagePublius uses Greek confederacies to show how rule through sovereign member states could produce domination and disorder.
Read cited passagePublius compares European confederacies whose central laws could not reliably govern their own member states.
Read cited passagePublius uses the Dutch confederacy to show the weakness of a central government dependent on sovereign provinces.
Read cited passageHamilton argues that a federal government needs laws it can execute, not resolutions dependent on state compliance.
Read cited passageMadison's famous anatomy of the plan: republican in principle, and neither wholly national nor wholly federal but a composition of both, examined through five distinct relations from ratification to amendment.
Madison's most quoted statement of the federal balance: powers delegated to the federal government are few and defined, those remaining with the states numerous and indefinite.
Madison argues the people, not either government, are the ultimate authority, and that ambitious federal encroachments would meet the organized resistance of thirteen sets of state governments.
Madison meets the charge that the new government mixes legislative, executive, and judicial power. Montesquieu, he shows, never demanded total separation, and no state constitution practices it.
Madison warns that parchment barriers cannot restrain power. The legislative department everywhere extends the sphere of its activity, drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
The most famous statement of checks and balances. If men were angels, no government would be necessary; since they are not, ambition must be made to counteract ambition.
Brutus opens the series by asking whether thirteen states can be melted into one republic at all, drawing on Montesquieu to argue that a free republic cannot survive over so vast a territory.
Brutus II is the series' bill-of-rights essay: since the new government reaches life, liberty, and property as completely as any state government, its silence on reserved rights is astonishing and dangerous.
The Federal Farmer opens by framing the whole ratification question as a choice among three forms of union, and charges that the Constitution aims at consolidating the states into one government.
Letter II states the Federal Farmer's core structural test: a free government needs full and equal representation and local jury trial, and he argues one government over so extensive a country can provide neither.
This is one of the earliest full statements of the bill of rights argument: since the Constitution already secures habeas corpus and bans ex post facto laws, its silence about other rights implies they are given up.
Answering the Federalist claim that a bill of rights is needless, the Federal Farmer points to the no-titles clause: if that cautionary ban was worth writing down, so are jury trial, the press, and security against searches.
Letter XVII supplies the Federal Farmer's sharpest analytic tool: a government is consolidated not by its structure but by whether its laws operate directly on individuals instead of through the states.
Cato argues that one government cannot represent and govern a territory this large without losing republican accountability.
Read cited passageThe Pennsylvania Minority argues that the Constitution grants power without expressly protecting fundamental rights.
Read cited passageMason argues that federal supremacy leaves state declarations of rights unable to protect people from the new government.
Read cited passageArticle VII's rule that nine state conventions suffice was itself a break with the legal order it replaced: Article XIII of the Confederation forbade any alteration without the agreement of Congress and every state legislature.

